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bstract
This article analyzes the microeconomic relation between innovation and employment, using company data from R&D Scoreboard
or Europe covering 2000–2008. A reduced form equation in which R&D can account for both product and process innovation is
stimated. The existence of non-constant elasticities is assessed, due to the combination of efficient scale and decreasing return
o R&D: in our empirical estimates the scale effect tends to prevail for a given R&D intensity generating an increasing relation
etween total turnover and employment. These results have important implications for policymakers: innovation supporting policies
hould be correctly tailored and monitored since the results depend on the characteristics of the benefiting firms. Moreover, R&D
ntensity on GDP should be managed with care if taken as a policy target, given that the denominator is endogenous and non-linearly
ependent on research expenditure.
 2014 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
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esumo
Este artigo analisa a relac¸ão microeconômica entre a inovac¸ão eo emprego, utilizando os dados do R&D Scoreboard para a
uropa cobrindo 2000-2008. Estima-se uma equac¸ão em forma reducida em que a I&D podem ser responsâveis por inovac¸ão de
roducto ou de processos. A existência de elasticidades não constantes é avaliada, devido à combinac¸ão de escala eficiente e retornos
ecrecientes â I&D: em nossas estimativas o efeito de escala tende a prevalecer para um determinado nivel da intensidade de I&D
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gerando uma relac¸ão crescente entre volume de negócios total e emprego. Estes resultados têm implicac¸ões importantes para os
formuladores de políticas: as políticas de apoio â inovac¸ão devem ser corretamente adaptadas e monitoradas já que os resultados
dependem das características das empresas beneficiárias. Além disso, a intensidade de I&D no PIB como alvo de políticas deve ser
gerida com cuidado, uma vez que o denominador é endógeno e não linearmente dependente das despesas de investigac¸ão.
© 2014 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
Palavras chave: Variac¸ão tecnológica; I&D; Emprego; Datos de panel
1.  Introduction
This article deals with the relation between innovation and employment at the firm level. Our focus is on formalized
and structured innovation, i.e. new products and/or processes generated by an initial R&D expenditure. As explained
by Dosi (1988) and Pavitt (1984), innovation strategies are more diverse and there exist industries where the basic type
of innovative activity is based on embodied technological change or tacit knowledge accumulation, without formal
research. Considering these additional elements would return a more detailed picture, but would also complicate the
already difficult task of disentangling the channels through which the innovation–employment relationship takes place.
Our proxy for innovation is the research expenditure by firm. While at industry level some pooling effect may
operate, resulting in a log linear (i.e. constant elasticity) relation, at firm level there exists an underlying magmatic
heterogeneity, which may generate non-linearity.1 The extent of the latter is determined by at least two main effects:
(a) a scale effect: research and development expenditure (R&D) may have decreasing return to scale due to some fixed
factor, such as talent (Denicolò, 2007). If this is the case, a firm cannot reproduce in scale the innovative process with
constant return, and any new innovation will have a higher employment effect for a constant final demand. (b) A size
effect: larger firms (in terms of turnover) may enjoy an advantage in exploiting the benefits of research. This may be
interpreted in terms of the standard industrial organization tenet that unit (research) costs are decreasing over some
interval up to the minimum efficient scale.
The former tends to amplify the effect on employment: for any given increase in the market, if the impact of
innovation on productivity is decreasing, then the impact on jobs should increase at the margin. The latter tends to
reduce it: the larger the demand served by the firm, the higher the impact on productivity and the lower the impact on
employment. There is no a priori theoretical reason to indicate which of the two will prevail: it is a matter of empirical
assessment. In our measurement exercise we will focus on Europe using the European subsample of R&D Scoreboard
data, which covers around 80% of world business research and development expenditure.
The quantification of those non-linearities has important implications for innovation and competitiveness policy.
First of all, it helps to calibrate better the policy mix, since employment performance can also affect productivity. In
fact, in the short run technological unemployment may exist, reducing aggregate demand and thus indirectly lowering
productivity via Kaldor–Verdoorn2 effect and/or the scrapping of specific human capital. Moreover, it may occur that
workers have to reallocate to jobs where the labour productivity level is lower. As a result, innovative policies aimed
at supporting growth may miss the target because of indirect effects.
The second reason is that in presence of non-linear effects, we can have various instruments to reach the same target,
and they may have very different opportunity costs. For instance, in Europe – we refer to the Europe 20203 agenda – the
chosen target is the three percent ratio of R&D on GDP. Empirically, it is well documented that the typical firm in the
industry tends to define its strategy in terms of some routines such as “spend ×  percent of the turnover” (Dosi, 1988).
As a result, one may conceptualize the three percent rule as a simple generalization from micro to macro. However,
this reasoning is based on a fallacy of composition. The denominator of the target (the product of productivity for
employment) is endogenous, in the very spirit of the agenda, since the aim  to  increase  R&D  expenditure  is  motivated
by its  impact  of  productivity  and  employment. In other words, not only the quantitative increase in spending matters,
1 From now on, by non-linear we mean that the employment elasticity of R&D is not constant.
2 The Kaldoor–Verdoorn law postulate a positive relation between growth of output and growth of productivity, due to (dynamic) increasing
returns, see Verdoorn (1949).
3 European Commission (2010).
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ut also the qualitative composition of it, since the impact on productivity and employment can be very different across
rms: in practice, the same gross amount of R&D spending may end up into a different R&D/GDP ratio.
We claim that the R&D intensity could be seen from two perspectives, as an extensive margin or an intensive
ne. The extensive margin is characterized by adding new actors (firms or sectors, in the sense of sectoral system
f innovation, e.g. Malerba, 2002, 2004) with high knowledge intensity, while the intensive margin is reached by
ncreasing the intensity of existing “big players”, i.e. those who outspend the others in research. There are clear-cut
onsequences whether we privilege the extensive or the intensive one, in terms of the kind of actors that we directly
upport (small versus big firms) or indirectly in terms of the institutions that we want to promote. It is now clear that
he dynamics of this “intensive” margin depends on the combination of the size and scale effects.
Our results confirm that size impacts negatively through an interaction effect with R&D expenditure, while the scale
f R&D has a convex impact. As a result of their magnitude, for a constant R&D intensity (as defined by the ratio
etween R&D and sales) the marginal effect (in terms of elasticity) of R&D on sales is increasing in the scale of the
utput of the firm. Moreover, for constant output, R&D intensity matters positively on the elasticity.
In terms of policy, there is a clear trade-off: innovation by large firms has a ceteris paribus larger impact on
mployment, but at the cost of fostering concentration (a large part of the effect is probably driven by business stealing),
.e. hampering the transfer of the gain of innovation to consumers and of pushing the overall economy towards more
nflexibility, since the reallocation of workers when a shock hits a small firms is faster. An ideal policy would then try
o promote the emergence of small firms with high knowledge intensity: the latter would at least partly compensate
he size effect maintaining flexibility and softening concentration. Practical implementation of this policy is difficult
t least, and the design is beyond the scope of this paper, but we will comment on the issue in the concluding remarks.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents some state of the art on the relation between R&D and employ-
ent. Section 3 discusses methodology and data. Section 4 the results. Section 5 concludes. Technical parts are included
n Appendix A.
.  State  of  the  art
The relation between innovation and employment has received a cyclical interest depending on the rhythm and pace
f technological change in the real economy. The literature on this topic is now huge and a systematic review is beyond
he scope of this article. Nevertheless, we will mention some key issues.
First of all, the controversy is also theoretical: small differences in the framework of analysis give totally different
redictions. If we rely on general equilibrium framework, the issue is almost a non-sense, because equilibrium implies
ull employment, by definition. This does not apply for classical economists, where the reference model assumes a given
age and perfectly elastic supply of labour (through the Malthusian population mechanism). As a result “classical”
quilibrium does not necessarily imply absence of unemployment. Classical economists elaborate the theory of compen-
ation mechanisms, putting forth that initial labour saving effects will be recovered by adjustment in demand (coming
hrough prices and/or income effects, as explained in Vivarelli, 1995). However, even in neoclassical framework, adding
mall frictions in the wage setting mechanism will generate unemployment, thus technical change can generate alterna-
ive long run scenarios depending on the direction of change: e.g. in an efficiency wage case with monitoring, whether
he technical change improves monitoring capacity or raise “potential” productivity generates different consequences.
If we depart from equilibrium framework towards evolutionary (out of equilibrium) dynamics, then adjustment lags
nd continuous processes of variety and selection imply a number of controversial trade-offs. In this situation the time
ecessary to re-establish full employment can be considerable (a discussion is in Van Reenen, 1997).
Empirically, the issue is even more controversial: the level of analysis is determinant in the sense that at micro
evel we should take into account the possibility that the positive employment effect of innovation is simply driven
y business stealing; at industry level we can miss information depending on the possible bias towards services or
anufacturing; finally at macro level there exist huge measurement problems due to aggregation, besides the obvious
mpossibility to comprehend the overall dynamics behind (Bogliacino and Vivarelli, 2012).
If we focus on the micro level, the consensus can be summed up as follows: at firm level technological change
reates employment; at industry level the direct employment effect is positive in the case of product innovation (and
hus R&D), but can be negative for process innovation. If we consider also the indirect effect, i.e. compensation
echanisms, the full and instantaneous compensation cannot be assumed ex ante (Chennels and Van Reenen, 2002;
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Pianta, 2005; Vivarelli, 2007, for some recent contributions, Piva and Vivarelli, 2005; Harrison et al., 2008; Hall et al.,
2008; Ping et al., 2008; Bogliacino and Pianta, 2010).
Finally, since we mention the EU competitiveness policies (Europe 2020), this exercise may contribute to the
assessment exercise of the Agenda. There has been a very large interest on the productivity consequences of increasing
R&D, but less focus has been put on the expected change in employment. As the former is concerned, there is now a
large consensus that research driven innovation is a major force shaping growth (Ortega-Argilés et al., 2010). As the
latter is concerned, there have been some articles trying to quantify the impact of reaching the targets both at industry
level (Bogliacino and Vivarelli, 2012) and through general equilibrium computations (Chevallier et al., 2006; Gelauff
and Lejour, 2006; Gardiner and Bayar, 2010). Although very sensible to the assumptions, all studies agree that the
impact would be positive.
3.  Methodology  and  data
In order to formulate our reduced form labour demand to estimate, we start from one of the workhorse of the
literature on R&D and innovation, i.e. the “patent race” (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980): firms compete in R&D to gain
some market power from an innovation. This market power depends on the appropriability conditions, i.e. the extent
of intellectual property rights protection or learning lags, the features of the innovation itself (basically if drastic or
not) and the market structure, i.e. barriers to entry in research, competitive pressures from substitutable products and
from cumulativeness.4
We assume that the firm should decide factor hiring and R&D simultaneously and that the output of innovation
activity (new product and/or new process) is stochastic. As we will see, our framework captures both product and
process innovation.
Starting from the case in which a firm carries out R&D to introduce a new product, we assume that it has a
CES production function, and in case of success, can face a downward sloping inverse demand curve with elasticity
ε:P = CY−ε, where C  is a parameter, while, if it fails to innovate, remains price taker. The expected profit of the firm is
thus:
max
K,L,Z
(p  +  q(R&D,  Y )CY−ε)Y  −  wL  −  rK  s.t. Y  =  [Kσ +  Lσ]1/σ (1)
where w  and r  are the rental prices of factors, q  is a probability5 which depends on output and R&D expenditure and
σ is a parameter of substitutability between labour and capital.
The labour demand to be estimated can be extracted from first order conditions (FOCs):
(p  +  (1 −  ε)q(R&D,  Y )CY−ε)Y1−σLσ−1 =  w  (2)
readjusting and taking logs, we get our main equation:
log(Lit) =  α0 +  α1 log(wit) +  α2 log(Yit) +  α3 log(Φ(R&Dit,  Yit)) +  ui +  ηit (3)
where Φ(R&Dit,Yit) is some non-linear function to be estimated.
Interestingly enough, we arrive at a similar expression also if we assume that the firm tries to improve the productive
process. In this case its problem becomes:
min
K,L
wL  +  rK  s.t. Y  ≤  (At +  q(R&D,  Y )At+1)[Kσ +  Lσ]1/σ (4)
where At+1 > At represent the result of the innovation and the price is either other firms’ marginal costs or the monopoly
price, depending on the (drastic versus non-drastic) nature of innovation.
Writing the FOCs from the problem in Eq. (5) we can write:
λ(At +  q(R&D,  Y )At+1)Y1−σLσ−1 =  w  (5)
where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier. Again, taking logs and readjusting, we get (3).
4 Although phrased in terms of patents, Denicolò (2007) addressed all these issues in his general setup. The focus on patents is almost immaterial
for our interest and the model can still be considered as a basic reference once relabelling patents with “secrecy” or “learning lags” as the main tools
to appropriate rents from innovation.
5 Needless to say, this probability is heterogeneous and depends on expectations and capabilities by firms. However, since we want to estimate
the average impact we neglect this issue as a first approximation.
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We estimate (3) by fixed effects, to get rid of unobserved heterogeneity, and using a polynomial approximation of
(R&Dit,Yit). In Appendix A we provide a justification of the functional form in terms of Taylor expansion at the
econd order.
As stressed by Van Reenen (1997), the above equation represents the relationship at industry level. If technology
doption was immediate, the employment effect should not be related with the identity of the first mover. However, in
he Schumpeterian perspective diffusion may take time, because of intellectual property rights protection or learning
ags, secrecy or other informal means of protection, and the first mover will enjoy a market share increase above industry
evel expansion with a further impact on employment. As a result, it is preferable to include lags of R&D expenditure.
.1.  Data
We use data from the R&D Scoreboard. It collects data for the top R&D spenders; data are consolidated at group
evel, i.e. including all the subsidiaries. We have access to data from the editions of the Scoreboard 2004–2009. Each
coreboard gathers data over the four previous years, and a choice should be taken over the overlapping information:
n our case, whenever a year is covered by more than one edition, the last one is considered the dominant source.
The number of firms covered is changing through the various editions: 500 EU and 500 non-EU in the first year,
aising to 700 EU and 700 non-EU in 2005 and finally arriving at 1000 and 1000 from 2006 onwards. We are using
ata for the EU firms only. The Scoreboard provides data for R&D investment, sales, capital expenditure, employees
nd operating surplus. We end up with an unbalanced panel covering the years 2000–2008. Capital expenditures, sales
nd operating surplus are recorded from balance sheet, according to the interactional accounting standard definitions
i.e. capital expenditure is the total flow of investment in tangible assets). As a result, the measures are homogeneous
cross companies. R&D investment is recorded according to the Frascati Manual definition (OECD, 2002). Employees
nclude all formal jobs of the company.
Scoreboard data cover more than 80% of total R&D expenditure, thus our database covers almost the universe of
&D doers located in Europe.
In case of mergers, we define a new firm, i.e. the old firms end their existence in the year of the merge, and a new
ntity appears. To control for other big events (acquisitions, change of name etc.) we create a dummy variable (equal
o one whenever the event occur for the individual firm).
Data are expressed in 2000 Euro at purchasing power parity (PPP) (the source for deflators and PPP is Eurostat).
Scoreboard data do not provide information on wages. However, we have information on capital expenditure and
perating surplus that we use as proxies. Increasing/decreasing operating surplus means that the firm is succeeding,
nd this will translate into higher wages. The opposite happens for capital expenditure: it is usually aimed at saving
n labour costs, thus reducing bargaining power and wages. To see consistency of the instruments, we use two indirect
trategies. First of all, we look at a similar database at industry level data to see if the correlation is robust. Data are
aken from OECD STAN and ANBERD.6 Spearman rho is .7442 (p-value = .0000) between log-compensation per
mployee and log-capital expenditure. Between log-operating surplus and log-compensation per employee it is .7490
p-value = .0000).
Secondly, we use a complementary data source at company level. We use microdata for listed companies with
eadquarter in Europe and positive R&D expenditure,7 to have a comparable sample for the period covered by our
stimation. Of course, listed companies may belong to the same group and cover only a part of our database, where both
isted and private firms are included; nevertheless, they can provide an estimation of the relationship among the variables.
pearman rho is .2724 (p-value = .0000) between log-compensation per employee and log-capital expenditure. Betweenog-operating surplus and log-compensation per employee it is .1610 (p-value = .0000). In the literature, an example
f the use of various measures of quasi-rents as an instrument to capture wage dynamics in an estimated bargaining
6 The cleaned database resulting from the merge of sectoral and R&D data includes Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
ermany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom for the period 1996–2005, at two digits level. Sector
ncluded are 15–16; 17; 18; 19; 20; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 26; 27; 28; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33; 34; 35; 36–37; 55; 72; 73; 74.
7 The source of the data is Research Insight’s Global Vantage Database by Standard and Poor’s, updated to the 31st of January 2010. The extraction
as been performed using the criteria ‘Europe’ and ‘positive R&D’ over the years 2000–2008. All monetary values have been converted to millions
f Euro using foreign exchange data of 2008 and then deflated using GDP deflators (base year is 2008), from Eurostat.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Firms Standard deviation
(Average T) Mean Within Between Overall
Employment 1485
(6.24)
18,221.29 9469.51 42,257.79 46,150.63
Sales 1486
(6.24)
4072.04 3412.91 12,029.58 14,403.24
Capital investment 1391
(5.24)
292.08 410.87 1019.12 1207.00
Operating surplus 1486
(5.90)
342.46 1096.86 1481.27 1988.67
R&D 1486
(5.96)
96.66 89.64 333.82 406.22Source: R&D Scoreboard data, full sample. Expenditure data in million Euros at PPP 2000.
model is Van Reenen (1996). The impact of capital expenditure on wage dynamics is documented at industry level in
Feenstra and Hanson (1999).
In practical terms, operating surplus is negative for many firms, implying that a log transformation would induce
selection into the sample. Since the distribution is leptokurtic, taking simply the level is not feasible, thus we rescale
the variable adding its minimum and taking log. Since we are not interested in interpreting the coefficient, we found
this as the best strategy. Capital expenditure, R&D investment and operating surplus are not rescaled by number of
employees to avoid introducing a source of endogeneity.
In Table 1 we report the standard descriptive statistics.
As can be seen by the descriptive statistics, the sample shows a very large variability and tends to over-represent
large groups (as one can expect, the small firms with high R&D intensity are mainly gazelles or research labs). The
large variability of operating profits should not be seen as a surprise given that these very innovative firms quite often
either go bankrupt or make a huge amount of extra profits.
An important issue concerns sample selection, namely the external validity of the results. Given the very logic
of the Scoreboard (i.e. a ranking), by all means there is a selection, in the sense that this is not a random sample.
However, given our interest on the effect of R&D, the issue can be neglected, because we are covering almost the
entire population of R&D expenditure in Europe. A simple comparison between R&D Scoreboard and BERD data
from secondary sources shows that the concentration of R&D expenditure is so high that what is left aside by the
Scoreboard is of second order. The 1000 top investors’ expenditure (from the R&D Scoreboard) is as high as the 73%
(2004), 75% (2005), 77% (2006), 83% (2007) of the total BERD in US, EU27, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland
and Republic of Korea (Eurostat). If we compare the same top 1000 with the total OECD BERD expenditure we get:
67% (2004), 68% (2005), 70% (2006), and 75% (2007).
Moreover, since we have group data, we are controlling for potential selection due to allocation of R&D expenditure
for tax purpose within groups, which standard analyses tend to neglect, but can matter a lot.
4.  Results
In Appendix A, we provide some diagnostic tests in Table A2. Fixed effects estimator is supported by the Hausman
test. In order to approximate the non-linear function Φ(·,·), we choose a quadratic polynomial with an interaction with
output. We have tried also a third degree polynomial, but it is rejected (as shown in Table A2). In Appendix A, we
provide a formal proof of the derivation of (6) from (3). Our estimated equation is:
log(Lit) =  α0 +  α1 log(wit) +  α2 log(Yit) +  α3 log(R&Dit) +  α4 log(R&Dit) log(Yit)
+ α5 log2(R&Dit) +  ui +  ηit (6)
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Table 2
Dependent variable: log of employees.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Yit) 0.395
(0.008)***
0.322
(0.009)***
0.334
(0.011)***
0.362
(0.011)***
0.234
(0.012)***
log(OSit) −0.038
(0.013)***
−0.027
(0.012)**
−0.027
(0.012)**
−0.024
(0.012)*
−0.031
(0.012)***
log(Iit) 0.103
(0.005)***
0.084
(0.005)***
0.084
(0.005)***
0.080
(0.005)***
0.057
(0.005)***
log(R&Dit) 0.131
(0.008)***
0.160
(0.016)***
0.161
(0.016)***
0.232
(0.015)***
log(R&Dit−1) 0.034
(0.007)**
0.034
(0.007)***
0.030
(0.007)***
0.021
(0.006)***
log(R&Dit−2) 0.047
(0.006)***
0.047
(0.006)***
0.043
(0.006)***
0.042
(0.006)***
log(R&Dit) log(Yit) −0.004
(0.002)**
−0.020
(0.002)***
−0.041
(0.002)***
log2(R&Dit) 0.021
(0.002)***
0.027
(0.002)***
log2(Yit) 0.027
(0.001)***
Constant 5.896
(0.149)***
5.591
(0.141)***
5.533
(0.144)***
5.442
(0.143)***
5.357
(0.136)***
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N obs. 6992 5130 5130 5130 5130
R2 (overall) 0.809 0.766 0.763 0.758 0.781
Source: R&D Scoreboard data.
All columns refer to within group estimation. Standard errors in parenthesis. Y stands for sales, OS for operating surplus, and I for capital expenditure
and R&D for R&D expenditure.
* Significant at 10%.
*
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n Table 2, we report our baseline estimation of (3). Since the sample included firms with very high capital investment
nd R&D investment intensity – mainly research labs – we check for the presence of outliers. The Grubbs test (Grubbs,
969) is negative, thus we use the full sample. As a robustness check, in Table A1 we also report the estimation for the
runcated sample (at 100% intensities), showing only minor differences.
Since we use both interaction and quadratic terms, there may be some risk of multicollinearity. The variance
nflation factor (for the OLS estimator) is indeed a bit high (the average is around twenty). For this reason, we report
he estimation sequentially, adding regressors one at a time and we found the results very stable. In column one, we
stimate a reduced form of labour demand with operating surplus and capital expenditure as proxies for wages, and
utput measured by total sales. In column two, we include R&D expenditures (current one and the first two lags). In
olumn three and four we add an interaction term with output and a quadratic term for R&D. In column five we report
he estimation including the quadratic term for log-sales. In all estimations we add time dummies to control for supply
ffects. We add also a dummy for events (mergers, acquisition, significant change of name etc.).
As can be expected, output (i.e. demand) is the larger determinant of employment, while our proxies for wages are
ignificant and their coefficients are stable through alternative specifications. In particular, increasing operating surplus
eans that the firm is succeeding, and this will translate into higher wages, thus negatively affecting employment. The
pposite happens for capital expenditure: since it has labour saving effects, it reduces bargaining power, constraining
ages and thus pushing employment.
Coming to our main interest, R&D has a non-linear effect on employment, as expected. First of all, the effect is
oulded by time lags, coherently with the Schumpeterian framework. However, contemporaneous terms also matter:
s we made clear in the methodological part, the firm should hire factor services before knowing the result of the
esearch, in order to be ready to produce at the new conditions. As a result, while productivity impact of R&D takes
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Fig. 1. The marginal effect of R&D.
bSource: R&D Scoreboard data, sample truncated at R&D and capital intensity both less than 100%. Data refer to the marginal effect calculated for
some given value of the R&D intensity, allowing the sales to change.
significant lags, in the employment case research spans its effects since the beginning. Secondly, the interaction term
operates negatively, as expected. Finally our convexity hypothesis – what we called scale effect – is not rejected by
data.
In order to compute the implied employment impact, taking into account the size and scale effects, we can rearrange
the employment elasticity of R&D in the following way – focusing on the short run effect, neglecting the time persistence
of the impact:
∂  log(Lit)
∂  log(R&Dit)
=  α3 +  α4 log(Yit) +  2α5 log(R&Dit) =  α3 + (α4 +  2α5) log(Yit) +  2α5 log
(
R&Dit
Yit
)
(7)
There are three components in Eq. (7):
a) The direct elasticity, invariant to firm characteristics (α3).
) The intensive margin, related to R&D intensity (2α5 log((R&Dit)/Yit));
c) The extensive margin, which is given by the interaction of the scale and size effects, dependent on the turnover
((α4 + 2α5) log(Yit)).
Assuming that the firm decides on the R&D intensity by means of a (revisable) routine, we can fix it at alternative
levels, and then see how the employment elasticity of R&D increases when we enlarge the size. We should remind
that for a given R&D intensity, if we increase the output, then we implicitly increase also the R&D expenditure level.
The results are shown in Fig. 1, where we have plotted the estimated employment elasticity of R&D for various R&D
intensities as a function of turnover (in log scale).
As one can easily see, both intensive and extensive margins operate in the same direction: for a given size, increasing
the R&D intensity raises the employment elasticity. For a given R&D intensity, increasing the size raises the employment
impact as well. This leaves the legislator with a clear choice between two very different policy options: on the one
hand, favouring entry of research intensive firms; on the other hand, spurring growth of existing firms.Another way to disentangle the drivers of the employment effect is to separate the direct effect, the scale effect and
the size effect. In general these marginal effects are dependent on the amount of R&D and sales of the company. In
Table A3 we present an estimation of the three components for a company with a 1% R&D intensity.
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Table 3
Dependent variable: log of employment.
(1) (2) (1) (2)
log(Yit) 0.563
(0.014)***
0.476
(0.032)***
0.232
(0.012)***
0.359
(0.011)***
log(OSit) −0.028
(0.011)**
−0.029
(0.011)**
−0.030
(0.011)**
−0.024
(0.012)*
log(Iit) 0.057
(0.006)***
0.055
(0.006)***
0.057
(0.005)***
0.080
(0.005)***
log(R&Dit) 0.226
(0.034)***
0.264
(0.036)***
0.304
(0.031)***
0.266
(0.033)***
log(R&Dit−1) 0.020
(0.007)***
0.019
(0.007)***
0.020
(0.006)***
0.029
(0.007)***
log(R&Dit−2) 0.037
(0.006)***
0.038
(0.006)***
0.041
(0.006)***
0.042
(0.006)***
log(R&Dit) log(Yit) −0.020
(0.003)***
−0.027
(0.004)***
−0.040
(0.003)***
−0.018
(0.002)***
log2(R&Dit) 0.018
(0.002)***
0.020
(0.003)***
0.027
(0.002)***
0.020
(0.002)***
log(R&Dit) log(Sit) −0.008
(0.002)***
−0.008
(0.002)***
−0.007
(0.002)***
−0.010
(0.002)***
log2(Yit) 0.008
(0.002)***
0.027
(0.001)***
Constant 4.893
(0.145)***
4.715
(0.155)***
5.373
(0.136)***
5.464
(0.143)***
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Events Yes Yes Yes Yes
N obs. 4893 4893 5130 5130
R2 (overall) 0.759 0.761 0.780 0.755
Source: R&D Scoreboard data, full sample for columns (3) and (4), sample truncated at R&D and capital intensity both less than hundred percent
for columns (1) and (2).
All columns refer to within group estimation. Standard errors in parenthesis. Y stands for sales, OS for operating surplus, I for capital expenditure,
S for R&D expenditure by firms in the same industry and R&D for R&D expenditure.
* Significant at 10%.
**
*
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pSignificant at 5%.
** Significant at 1%.
.1.  Robustness  check
We performed some robustness check. First of all, one possible objection is that the non-linearities are simply a
eflection of some measurement error due to spillovers: given the sequential nature of innovation in many technological
rajectories, it may be likely that firms are also investing in R&D as a means to appropriate knowledge generated
lsewhere (absorptive capacity). This may result in some labour saving consequences.
In order to control for it, we calculate the log of total amount of R&D performed by competitors in the same industry
defined at four digits) – it can be summed since it is in PPP – and we interact it with the log of R&D.
As shown in Table 3, results are robust and there are additional labour saving consequences. We report the regressions
n the full sample and the truncated sample.
A further robustness check regards the potential endogeneity: R&D expenditures are largely due to researchers
alaries and this is obviously related to employment. Of course, R&D employees are a minor share of total employment,
hus this effect can indeed be negligible. Nevertheless, we have information on R&D employees for a subsample of
rms, for which we can run the regression on non-R&D employment.
The sample is considerably restricted and both the Grubbs test for outliers and the variance inflation factor appear
ore worrying, thus we run the estimation on the restricted sample and neglecting the lags of R&D. As usual, we
rovide estimation in sequence to check for stability.
The main results are confirmed, as can be seen in Table 4.
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Table 4
Dependent variable: log of non-R&D employment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Yit) 0.605
(0.029)***
0.570
(0.032)***
0.596
(0.036)***
0.623
(0.040)***
0.532
(0.073)***
log(OSit) −1.885
(0.535)***
−1.800
(0.535)***
−1.626
(0.546)***
−1.547
(0.548)***
−1.682
(0.555)***
log(Iit) 0.057
(0.006)***
0.053
(0.016)***
0.053
(0.016)***
0.053
(0.016)***
0.048
(0.016)***
log(R&Dit) 0.067
(0.027)**
0.154
(0.061)**
0.158
(0.061)**
0.212
(0.071)***
log(R&Dit) log(Yit) −0.013
(0.008)*
−0.026
(0.012)**
−0.041
(0.015)**
log2(R&Dit) 0.016
(0.010)*
0.021
(0.011)*
log2(Yit) 0.012
(0.008)
Constant 23.375
(5.514)***
22.512
(5.514)***
20.585
(5.644)***
19.708
(5.671)***
21.200
(5.758)***
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N obs. 1743 1743 1743 1742 1743
R2 (overall) 0.703 0.730 0.774 0.787 0.762
Source: R&D Scoreboard data, sample truncated at R&D and capital intensity both less than hundred percent.
All columns refer to within group estimation. Standard errors in parenthesis. Y stands for sales, OS for operating surplus, I for capital expenditure,
S for R&D expenditure by firms in the same industry and R&D for R&D expenditure.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
5.  Concluding  remarks  and  policy  implications
In this paper we have examined the relation between innovation and employment at firm level, focusing on the
most formalized and structured part of the innovative activity, carried out through R&D expenditure. We have esti-
mated the employment elasticity of innovation in Europe using a panel built from the R&D Scoreboard data for
the period 2000–2008. Our formulation accounts for product and process innovation, using R&D expenditure as a
proxy.
In our empirical estimation, we detect a size effect, driven by the greater efficiency of the research conducted by
large firms, but also a scale effect, i.e. a decreasing return to R&D expenditure. For a given R&D intensity, the latter
tends to prevail, in such a way that for any increase in the market share by a firm, the employment elasticity of R&D
tends to increase as well.
Finally, we state below some policy implications.
First of all, the share of R&D on GDP should be taken with caution as a monitoring target, since the denominator is
endogenous. We focus on employment – but the same can be stated for productivity: the effect on employment by an
increase in R&D is not constant, thus it is very difficult to predict how an increase in absolute spending can transmit
into the resulting R&D/GDP observed.
Second, we claim that the employment implication of innovation supporting policies should be correctly calculated.
In the medium run destroying too many jobs can be harmful to productivity: although a rapid innovation pace can
improve productivity in the sectors in which it occurs, many of the workers may reallocate towards jobs with low
technological content (because of specific human capital, absence of capabilities, lack of competitive pressures that
spur innovation by firms and so on) counteracting the above effect on the aggregate labour productivity. As a result,
innovation policies should be matched with human capital accumulation and welfare policies that help mobility and
reallocation of resources.
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Third, the same effect on employment can be reached by the entry of new knowledge intensive firms or by the
rowth of existing ones. The first of the two strategies is superior for two reasons: (a) it prevents harmful con-
entrations; (b) it leaves more flexibility to the system, given that a large share of these new firms is likely to be
mall.
ppendix  A.  Robustness  check
We first prove formally that (6) is a Taylor approximation of (3). Allow Φ(·,·) to be a function of innovative input
defined x) and production (defined z), and define Φi(·,·) as the partial derivative with respect to the ith argument. It is
easonable to assume that Φ(0,0) > 0, since there is a positive probability to innovate for firms outside the market and
lso for firms who are not investing, due to spillover and/or imitation. A Taylor expansion at the second order around
0,0) returns:
log Φ(z,  y) =  log(Φ(0,  0)) + Φ1(0,  0)
Φ(0,  0) x +
Φ12(0,  0)
Φ(0,  0) y  +  (−Φ
−2(0,  0)Φ21(0,  0) + Φ−1(0,  0)Φ11(0,  0))x2
+  2(−Φ−2(0,  0)Φ1(0,  0)Φ2(0,  0) +  Φ−1(0,  0)Φ12(0,  0))xy  +  (−Φ−2(0,  0)Φ22(0,  0)
+ Φ−1(0,  0)Φ22(0,  0))y2 +  ◦||(x,  z)||2
f we now use log(R&Dit) and log(Yit)as proxies for innovative input (x) and production (z) we can re-write:
log Φ(log(R&Dit),  log(Yit)) ∼= β0 +  β1 log(R&Dit) +  β2 log(Yit) +  β3 log2(R&Dit) +  β4 log(R&Dit) log(Yit)
+ β5 log2(Yit) (A1)
ince our main interest is in R&D expenditure, we can neglect β5. If we replace (A1) into (3) we get (6). In all tables
e report the full estimation of (6) with the complete second order expansion, including the second power of log-sales,
nd the specification is robust.
In order to test the robustness of our specification, we report the result for the truncated sample in the following
able A1. We exclude firms for which the R&D or capital investment intensity was larger than hundred percent. As we
an see, magnitude and significance of the coefficients are not affected by the truncation. In fact, the Grubb test does
ot report any specific outlier. As a further robustness check, we run the regression using the first and second lag for
nteraction and quadratic term, supporting the specification.
Finally, in Table A2 we provide some basic specification tests for the baseline version. In the first row, we report
he F-test, with the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from zero. The null
ypothesis is rejected at 1% level.
In the second row we report the F-test that all the fixed effects are equal to zero. The null is again rejected at 1%
evel.
In the third row we report the t-test of the coefficient of the cubic term for the R&D expenditure. This is the t-
tat computed when running the baseline specification with the cubic term included among the regressors. The null
ypothesis of equality to zero is not rejected.
Finally, we report the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). In the case in which the regressors are uncorrelated with the
nobservable time-invariant variables, the random effect will be a consistent and more efficient formulation, while if
he null hypothesis is rejected the fixed effect estimation should be preferred. The null hypothesis is rejected at 1% and
e retained the fixed effect formulation.
In Table A3 we report the direct, scale and size effects for a company with a 1% R&D intensity. The reported
lasticity should be interpreted as a percentage change in employment. In column (1) we report the sales in Euros, in
olumn (2) the R&D investment, in column (3) the direct effect, in column (4) the scale effect (due to the convexity of
&D costs), and in column (5) the size effect due to the economies of scales.
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Table A1
Dependent variable: log of employees.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Yit) 0.558
(0.009)***
0.523
(0.012)***
0.535
(0.013)***
0.567
(0.014)***
0.482
(0.032)***
log(OSit) −0.037
(0.012)***
−0.031
(0.011)***
−0.032
(0.011)***
−0.029
(0.011)**
−0.030
(0.011)**
log(Iit) 0.055
(0.009)***
0.059
(0.006)***
0.059
(0.006)***
0.057
(0.006)***
0.055
(0.006)***
log(R&Dit) 0.084
(0.008)***
0.119
(0.018)***
0.136
(0.018)***
0.172
(0.022)***
log(R&Dit−1) 0.024
(0.007)***
0.024
(0.007)***
0.020
(0.007)***
0.019
(0.007)***
log(R&Dit−2) 0.042
(0.006)***
0.041
(0.006)***
0.038
(0.006)***
0.039
(0.006)***
log(R&Dit) log(Yit) −0.004
(0.002)**
−0.021
(0.003)***
−0.028
(0.004)***
log2(R&Dit) 0.019
(0.002)***
0.021
(0.003)***
log2(Yit) 0.008
(0.002)***
Constant 4.885
(0.140)***
4.692
(0.138)***
4.622
(0.142)***
4.500
(0.142)***
4.687
(0.155)***
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N obs. 6328 4893 4893 4893 4893
R2 (overall) 0.788 0.768 0.764 0.761 0.763
Source: R&D Scoreboard data, sample truncated at R&D and capital intensity both less than hundred percent
All columns refer to within group estimation. Standard errors in parenthesis. Y stands for sales, OS for operating surplus, I for capital expenditure
and R&D for R&D expenditure.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%
Table A2
Dependent variable: log of employees. Specification tests.
(1)
Baseline specification
F test
(p value)
307.50
(0.000)
F  test: fixed effects
(p value)
57.42
(0.000)
t-Test on log3
(R&Dit)
−0.34
(0.730)
Hausman test
(p value)
3880.50
(0.000)
Source: R&D Scoreboard data.
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Table A3
Direct, size and scale effect.
(1)
Sales (Euro)
(2)
R&D (Euro)
(3)
Direct effect (%)
(4)
Scale effect (%)
(5)
Size effect (%)
100,000.00 1000.00 17.20 11.40 −10.50
110,000.00 1100.00 17.20 11.56 −10.59
121,000.00 1210.00 17.20 11.71 −10.67
133,100.00 1331.00 17.20 11.87 −10.76
146,410.00 1464.10 17.20 12.03 −10.85
161,051.00 1610.51 17.20 12.19 −10.93
177,156.10 1771.56 17.20 12.34 −11.02
194,871.71 1948.72 17.20 12.50 −11.11
214,358.88 2143.59 17.20 12.66 −11.20
235,794.77 2357.95 17.20 12.82 −11.28
259,374.25 2593.74 17.20 12.97 −11.37
285,311.67 2853.12 17.20 13.13 −11.46
313,842.84 3138.43 17.20 13.29 −11.54
345,227.12 3452.27 17.20 13.44 −11.63
379,749.83 3797.50 17.20 13.60 −11.72
417,724.82 4177.25 17.20 13.76 −11.80
459,497.30 4594.97 17.20 13.92 −11.89
505,447.03 5054.47 17.20 14.07 −11.98
555,991.73 5559.92 17.20 14.23 −12.06
611,590.90 6115.91 17.20 14.39 −12.15
672,749.99 6727.50 17.20 14.55 −12.24
740,024.99 7400.25 17.20 14.70 −12.33
S
R
B
B
C
C
D
D
D
E
F
G
G
G
H
H
H
M
M
O
O
Pource: Authors elaboration from R&D Scoreboard data (Table 3, column (4)).
eferences
ogliacino, F., Pianta, M., 2010. Innovation and employment: a reinvestigation using revised Pavitt classes. Res. Policy 39 (6), 799–809.
ogliacino, F., Vivarelli, M., 2012. The job creation effect of R&D expenditures. Aust. Econ. Pap. 51 (2), 96–113.
hennels, L., Van Reenen, J., 2002. The effects of technical change on skills, wages and employment: a survey of the microeconometric evidence.
In: Greenan, N., L’Horty, J., Mairesse, J. (Eds.), Productivity, Inequality and the Digital Economy: A Transatlantic Perspective. Cambridge
University Press, Massachusetts, pp. 175–225.
hevallier, C., Fougeyrollas, A., Le Mouël, P., Zagamé, P., 2006. A time to sow, a time to reap for the European countries: a macro-econometric
glance at the RTD national plans. Rev. OFCE 97Bis, 235–257.
asgupta, P., Stiglitz, J., 1980. Uncertainty, industrial structure, and the speed of R&D. Bell J. Econ. 11 (1), 1–28.
enicolò, V., 2007. Do patents over-compensate innovators? Econ. Policy 22, 679–729.
osi, G., 1988. Sources, procedures and microeconomic effects of innovation. J. Econ. Lit. 26, 1120–1171.
uropean Commission, 2010. EUROPE 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth COM(2010) 2020, Brussels.
eenstra, R.C., Hanson, G.H., 1999. The impact of outsourcing and high-technology capital on wages: estimates for the United States, 1979–1990.
Q. J. Econ. 114 (3), 907–909.
ardiner, B., Bayar, A., 2010. Evidence on R&D impact using macroeconomic and general equilibrium models. In: Paper Presented at the CONCORD
2010 Conference, Sevilla, 3–4 March 2010.
elauff, G.M.M., Lejour, A.M., 2006. The New Lisbon Strategy. An Estimation of the Economic Impact of Reaching Five Lisbon Targets. Industrial
Policy and Economic Reforms Papers 1. Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General. European Commission.
rubbs, F., 1969. Procedures for detecting outlying observations in samples. Technometrics 11 (1), 1–21.
all, B.H., Lotti, F., Mairesse, J., 2008. Employment, innovation and productivity: evidence from Italian micro-data. Ind. Corp. Change 17 (4),
813–839.
arrison, R., Jamandreu, J., Mairesse, J., Peters, B., 2008. Does innovation stimulate employment? A firm-level analysis using comparable micro-data
from four European countries. NBER wp 14216.
ausman, J.A., 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica 46 (6), 1251–1271.
alerba, F., 2002. Sectoral systems of innovation and production. Res. Policy 31, 247–264.
alerba, F., 2004. Sectoral Systems of Innovation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
ECD, 2002. Frascati Manual. Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research and Experimental Development. OECD, Paris.
rtega-Argilés, R., Piva, M., Potters, L., Vivarelli, M., 2010. Is Corporate R&D Investment In High-Tech Sectors More Effective? Contemporary
Economic Policy. West. Econ. Assoc. Int. 28 (3), 353–365, 07.
avitt, K., 1984. Patterns of technical change: towards a taxonomy and a theory. Res. Policy 13, 343–374.
154 F. Bogliacino / EconomiA 15 (2014) 141–154
Pianta, M., 2005. Innovation and employment. In: Fagerberg, J., Mowery, D., Nelson, R.R. (Eds.), Handbook of Innovation. Oxford University
Press, Oxford (Chapter 22).
Ping, H., Qjan, J., Lundin, N., Sjoholm, F., 2008. Technology development and job creation in China. Working Paper Series 697. Research Institute
of Industrial Economics.
Piva, C., Vivarelli, M., 2005. Innovation and employment: evidence from Italian microdata. J. Econ. 86, 65–83.
Van Reenen, J., 1996. The creation and capture of rents: wages and innovation in a panel of U.K. companies. Q. J. Econ. 111 (1), 195–226.
Van Reenen, J., 1997. Employment and technological innovation: evidence from U.K. manufacturing firms. J. Labor Econ. 15, 255–284.
Verdoorn, P.J., 1949. Fattori che regolano lo sviluppo della produttività. Industria I, 3–10.
Vivarelli, M., 1995. The Economics of Technology and Employment: Theory and Empirical Evidence. Elgar, Aldershot.
Vivarelli, M., 2007. Innovation and employment: a survey. Discussion Paper No. 2621. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn.
